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PRIVATE LAW AS BIOPOLITICS: 
ORDOLIBERALISM, SOCIAL MARKET 
ECONOMY, AND THE PUBLIC 
DIMENSION OF CONTRACT 
ALESSANDRO SOMMA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The transition of society from bourgeois to capitalist, that is, the coming of 
the Industrial after the French Revolution, transformed the proprietary order 
into a proprietary organism, incapable of producing emancipation. Private law 
was still the foundation of society and still had to free the individual. 
Nevertheless, pluralism had to be opposed in order to force economic behavior 
into cooperative schemes able to produce systemic balance and development. 
This is the point of reference for understanding the public dimension of 
contract law consistent with ordoliberalism, in which citizenship is reinterpreted 
through market categories: in particular those stressing that producers and 
consumers hold delegated economic police functions and have to react 
automatically to market stimuli. 
For many reasons the European Union has been conceived as an ordoliberal 
construct since its very beginning. Many efforts have been and still continue to 
be made to develop the idea that the common or internal market is “at the 
heart of the European project.”1 That’s why EU law is mainly concerned with 
the prevention of market failures—that is, with the imposition of the correct 
functioning of free competition. This goal is achieved by initiatives that are 
sharply criticized for showing little respect for democratic decision-making, such 
as those related to the recent sovereign debt restructuring. Indeed, sovereign 
debt restructuring is legitimating imposed legal change expected to enhance the 
efficient functioning of the market in ordoliberal terms.2 
To some extent this outcome is not surprising at all. From its very beginning, 
the ordoliberal agenda encouraged transformations in the balance between 
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 1.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Single Market Act. Twelve Levers to Boost 
Growth and Strengthen Confidence, at 3, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011). 
 2.  See Alessandro Somma, Legal Change and Sovereign Debt Crisis. The Clash Between 
Capitalism and Democracy in the Western Legal Tradition, in DO WE NEED AN ORDERLY WORK-OUT 
SCHEME FOR INSOLVENT SOVEREIGNS? (Cristoph Paulus ed., forthcoming 2013).  
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politics and economics that must be seen as a continuation of the process of the 
publicization of private law, the same process started with the crisis of the 
bourgeois society and the emergence of the capitalist one.3 This crisis 
culminated in the fascist reform of economic freedoms realized through the 
suppression of political freedoms. Even if political freedoms were reestablished 
after the fall of fascism, economic freedoms still characterize the construct of 
Europe as an ordoliberal project affecting, among others, the formation of a 
European contract law.4 This is what the concept of social market economy 
represents: supporting the formation of an economic police state to impose an 
economic eugenics and delegating economic police functions to individuals to 
accomplish related systemic tasks.5 
These are the points of reference for considering ordoliberalism and social 
market economy as biopolitics, as well as the related private law and public 
dimension of contract.6 
II 
THE PUBLICIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
Notoriously, the distinction between private and public law is an artificial 
one. It was conceived in a time when the economic and political spheres had to 
be separated, the first representing the protection of the individual menaced by 
the invasion of the second. While the political sphere was an organicist 
ambience dissolving the individual within the order (well represented by the 
image of the Leviathan),7 the economic sphere had to enhance individual 
freedom and emancipation, understood as access to the proprietary order.8 
The identification of the individual with the owner, and that of society with 
private law society, took place in a pre-capitalist context: it did not mean to 
impose “the rites of cannibalism in the name of self-interest.”9 Indeed, as was 
typical for a time when economics was still part of moral philosophy, 
accumulation beyond real utility had no justification—everyone could obtain 
property through labor, and workers had to be assured wages “at least sufficient 
to maintain” themselves.10 These were the foundations of the bourgeois society, 
in which the mythical invisible hand was understood to coordinate utilitarian 
behavior and induced the rich to “make nearly the same distribution of 
 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
 6.  See infra Part V. 
 7.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).  
 8.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 142–43 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). 
 9.  KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 112 (Beacon Press 1965) (1944). 
 10.  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 73 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) 
(1776). 
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necessaries of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into 
equal portions among all its inhabitants.”11 
The process of modernization, that is, the transition from the bourgeois to 
capitalist society, determined a profound alteration of this scheme. Mass 
production needed the accumulation of property, as well as the division and 
rationalization of labor, which ceased to assure access to property. The 
capitalist society was based on a “forced schematization of the existence,”12 
which was assured by the transformation of the economic sphere into an 
organicist ambience, with the systemic tensions typical of the political sphere 
taking possession of the economic sphere. 
In other words, even if discriminations based on feudal status had been 
overcome by the bourgeois society, individuals were now polarized along the 
lines of class-belonging, as is typical of the capitalist society.13 The dissimulation 
of the new reality set up and reinforced the separation of owners and non-
owners, as well as the premises of such divisions. The famous movement from 
status to contract was not up to its evolutionist premises: private law based on 
contractual freedom, understood as a value conceived for individual 
emancipation, had developed into a means of oppression. 
What then happened was the attempt to keep the identification of society 
with the private law society, but also to transform society’s foundations. Indeed, 
individual behaviors had to be functional in order to meet the needs of the 
organicist ambience they were forced to keep in balance and develop. Private 
law had to direct and coordinate the exercise of contractual freedom in order to 
make it compatible with industrial production, which is characterized by the use 
of machines and the imposition of strict hierarchies.14 
The “factory system” wanted to make sure “that the same rules apply to 
numerous groups of workmen, considering the identicalness of nature and 
duration of the labor relation.”15 The same happened with market relations—
those between producers as well as those between producers and consumers, 
the former developing within cartels and the latter around large-scale 
distribution, both determining the spread of standard-form contracts.16 
All this was in line with the idea of society as a whole, subject to dynamics 
analogous to those of a biological organism.17 Organicism and functionalism 
 
 11.  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 215 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2002) (1759). 
 12.  MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 439–40 (Steiner 2009) (1922). 
 13.  See OTTO BRUNNER, STORIA SOCIALE DELL’EUROPA NEL MEDIOEVO  38–40 (1988) (1978). 
 14.  SPIROS SIMITIS, The Case of the Employment Relationship, in PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL 
INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 193–94 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
 15.  Giuseppe Messina, I Concordati di Tariffe nell’Ordinamento Giuridico del Lavoro, 2 RIVISTA 
DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE I 458 (1904).  
 16.  See RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTE: CONTRIBUTION A L’ETUDE 
DE L’ACTE JURIDIQUE DANS LE CODE CIVIL ALLEMAND 229–30 (F. Pichon ed., Libraire Cotillon 
1901). 
 17.  AUGUSTE COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE 142 (Harry Martineau 
trans., Batoche Books 2000) (1842).  
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became a point of reference for an increasing number of rules aiming at 
conforming individual behavior under a systemic point of view, affecting private 
law in general and contract law in particular.18 The result was that individual 
emancipation could be conceived only as a side effect of measures devoted to 
producing the development of the proprietary order—now understood as 
proprietary organism. 
The result was an overcoming of the division of private and public law that 
laid at the basis of the bourgeois society and the beginning of what can be 
defined as the process of publicization of private law. The related body of rules 
was supposed to conform individual behaviors relevant to the functioning of the 
private law society, trying to outline a third way between traditional liberalism 
and the rising socialist thought. The main distinction was between rules directly 
conditioning the economic sphere and rules trying to do the same thing 
indirectly. Yet, from many points of view, this was a false distinction: different 
modes of regulation may be used to stabilize the same accumulation regime, 
understood as patterns of production and consumption reproducible over a long 
period.19 
The third way could take several forms. The supporters of solidarism, even 
if they focused on self-determination and on the related “struggle for individual 
development,” also sponsored an “association of individual actions” to 
“maintain the individual in enduring prosperity and security.”20 Similarly, 
functionalists recognized a certain space for “developing one’s individuality” 
only if the use of the related power performed the duty of contributing to the 
balance of the social organism.21 Professorial socialists pleaded for a new 
synthesis of private and public law in order to overcome the image of the 
“individual loose from any community.”22 A similar approach marked legal 
socialism in its attempt to promote the coordination of classes towards common 
ends.23 
III 
ORDOLIBERAL CONTRACT LAW 
The different ways of conceiving the process of publicization of private law 
were related to considerations such as the balance between individual and 
order, and the balance between emancipation and subordination to systemic 
needs. Nevertheless, even measures with undeniable positive effects on 
emancipation strategies had their systemic function, at least as social 
 
 18.  EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 142 (Presses Universitaires de 
France 1967) (1926). 
 19.  See Robert Boyer & Yves Saillard, A Summary of Régulation Theory, in REGULATION 
THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 36 (Robert Boyer & Yves Saillard eds., Routledge 2002). 
 20.  LEON BOURGEOIS, SOLIDARITE 61–62 (1902). 
 21.  LEON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATION GENERALES DU DROIT PRIVE 37 (1911). 
 22.  OTTO GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE GRUNDFRAGE IN 
WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION AM ENDE DES 19 JAHRHUNDERTS 9–12 (1889). 
 23.  GIUSEPPE SALVIOLI, I DIFETTI SOCIALI DELLE LEGGI VIGENTI 102–05 (1906). 
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peacekeeping tools or as a means of adapting society to the administrative tasks 
of the state or to economic necessities of production. These strategies 
influenced the emergence of the welfare state,24 which could be better described 
in terms of welfare of the state, created to educate individuals and to make 
them fit for armies and companies. 
In such a situation, the dominance of the order over the individual had to 
produce the abandonment of political freedoms, sacrificed to the reforms 
intended to functionalize economic freedoms. This was exactly what 
characterized the fascist third way between traditional liberalism and socialism 
and what determined its dominance over attempts to balance individual and 
order in such a way that conflict and emancipation could still coexist with 
systemic tensions.25 
This evolution of capitalist societies can best be described through the 
schemes suggested by a group of German scholars who were active during the 
Nazi dictatorship. These scholars, later indicated as ordoliberals, developed the 
idea of “economic constitution” in order to highlight the primacy of politics 
over economics, but in such a way that the rules of an economic order based on 
freedom of contract had to be seen as a point of political reference. These rules, 
together with competition as an overarching principle, had to be imposed as a 
political direction tool to enhance the functioning of the economic order26—that 
is, to prevent market failures due to the pursuit of individual strategies,27 both 
for economic and emancipative purposes. 
The economic constitution was thus a “partial constitution” to be put in tune 
with the “whole political constitution.” It had to enhance individuals’ 
cooperation in order to functionalize and standardize their economic 
performance, so as to strengthen the order from a systemic point of view: 
behaviors that were detrimental to the development of the system had to be 
sacrificed.28 These were the fundamental principles inspiring private law rules 
typical for that time, such as rules that denied the validity of contracts contrary 
to “interests worthy of protection under the legal order”29 or rules that fixed 
conditions for the validity of standard contract terms.30 
 
 
 24.  ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, RECHT, STAAT, FREIHEIT 170–208 (1st ed. 1991).  
 25.  See ALESSANDRO SOMMA, I GIURISTI E L’ASSE CULTURALE ROMA-BERLINO: ECONOMIA E 
POLITICA NEL DIRITTO FASCISTA E NAZIONALSOCIALISTA 81–122 (2005). 
 26.  FRANZ BÖHM, DIE ORDNUNG DER WIRTSCHAFT ALS GESCHICHTLICHE AUFGABE UND 
RECHTSSCHÖPFERISCHE LEISTUNG 10 (1937).  
 27.  See Leonhard Miksch, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Gebundenen Konkurrenz, in DER 
WETTBEWERB ALS MITTEL VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHER LEISTUNGSSTEIGERUNG UND 
LEISTUNGSAUSLESE 102–04 (Günter Schmölders ed., 1942).  
 28.  BÖHM, supra note 26, at 12–13.  
 29.  C.c. art. 1341–42. 
 30.  See id.; see also the rules discussed within the redaction of The Nazi Volksgesetzbuch, in 
AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT 1933–1945: PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHUSSE 
VOLKSGESETZBUCH 119 (Werner Schubert ed., 1988). 
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After the fall of the Nazi dictatorship, political freedoms were restored, but 
economic freedoms still had to be conformed in line with the ordoliberal 
agenda. For that reason, a new formula was needed to hide embarrassing 
continuities.31 That is why the term “social market economy” was coined, which 
indicated an “irenic” order, able to integrate and to “lead the essential forces of 
society towards real cooperation.”32 More precisely, economic freedoms had to 
be fostered when able to promote competition and opposed when they did not.33 
Freedom of contract had to be combined with mainly indirect state 
interventions aimed at conditioning individual behavior as needed to avoid 
market failures or to promote social cohesion. 
This is the point of reference for identifying the public dimension of 
contract, the same characterizing current efforts to develop a European private 
law, in line with the reference made by the Treaty on the European Union to “a 
highly competitive social market economy” as the foundation needed to 
“establish an internal market.”34 To that end, an international network of 
scholars was established and asked to provide “a more coherent European 
contract law,” focusing on improving the existing acquis and suggesting “an 
optional instrument, which would provide parties to a contract with a modern 
body of rules.”35 
The result was a “Draft Common Frame of Reference,” a set of “principles, 
definitions and rules of European Private Law.” These include freedom of 
contract as “the starting point,”36 with limitations intended to prevent market 
failures by functionalizing economic behavior in order to enhance its 
consistency with a free competition-based market order and to assume the 
related distributive effects as a point of reference for the European social 
model.37 
All this is in line with the approach inspiring the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which promotes only formal equality before the law and 
neglects social rights—that is, limitations on the freedom of contract for 
purposes directly connected with the will of promoting individual emancipation 
over market order.38 If individual capacities have to be promoted, it is only to 
fulfill an institutional precondition of an economy based on free competition.39 
 
 31.  This aspect is very controversial among scholars. See RALF PTAK, VOM ORDOLIBERALISMUS 
ZUR SOZIALEN MARKTWIRTSCHAFT (2004). 
 32.  Alfred Müller-Armack, Das Gesellschaftspolitische Leitbild der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, 12 
WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE CHRONIK 11 (1962). 
 33.  Walter Eucken, Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung, 2 ORDO 52, 52–57 (1949).  
 34.  Treaty on the European Union, art. 3. 
 35.  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A 
More Coherent European Contract Law—An Action Plan, at 23, COM (2003) 68 final (Feb. 2, 2003). 
 36.  STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & ACQUIS GRP., DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF 
REFERENCE—OUTLINE EDITION 62 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., European Law Publishers 2009). 
 37.  Alessandro Somma, Towards a European Private Law? The Common Frame of Reference in 
the Conflict between EC Law and National Laws, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW AFTER THE COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE 1–23 (Hans-W. Micklitz & Fabrizio Cafaggi eds., 2010).  
 38.  See THE POLITICS OF THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (Alessandro Somma ed., 
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IV 
SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY AS EUGENICS 
Due to its organicist inspiration, the social market economy does not take 
care of individual needs. Producers and consumers, seen as economic actors 
representing the whole system of supply and demand, have to accomplish 
systemic tasks: they hold delegated economic police functions defined within 
the ordoliberal way of functionalizing individual behaviors. Producers want to 
escape from competition, so the law has to preclude agreements among 
producers to prevent such an outcome. Consumers would avoid investing time 
to make an accurate and rational comparison of products to buy; nevertheless, 
their legal protection has to be conceived as mere promotion of self-
determination and capability of making informed choices.40 From this point of 
view, European contract law is developing as a sort of “Neo-Pandectistic,”41 
sponsoring a contract law based on Roman law categories, thus inventing a 
tradition for neoliberal visions of society. 
Workers disappear as an autonomous category: they have to behave as 
consumers or as producers, abandoning conflicting visions of their role in 
society and assuming a cooperative attitude toward their taking part in 
production. European citizenship, understood as the meeting point between the 
individual and the order, develops along the point of view of production and 
consumption instead of that of labor.42 
This scheme is needed to obtain a systemic effect consistent with a form of 
economic eugenics: to determine an efficient demand, which is, in turn, 
necessary to select supply within the competitive mechanism. It has nothing to 
do with individual emancipation, which would frustrate the functioning of the 
system by allowing individuals to develop in a different way than that conceived 
by the current form of economic racism43—outside the boundaries of homo 
oeconomicus based behavioral schemes. Neither does it have to do with the idea 
of taking the distributive effects of private law into account, since redistribution 
has to be the end of state interventions outside the market, which are meant to 
be financed through taxation and realized to avoid the formation of social 
rights. Private law has to ignore redistribution, or better, to reproduce the 
redistribution resulting from the functioning of the market: private law only has 
to guard the balance and development of the proprietary order by enhancing 
 
Wolters Kluwer 2009).  
 39.  Simon Deakin, Capacitas: Contract Law and Institutional Preconditions of a Market Economy, 
2 EUR. REV. CONTRACT LAW 317, 317–41 (2006).  
 40.  See ALESSANDRO SOMMA, ECONOMIA DI RAZZA: DAL FASCISMO ALLA CITTADINANZA 
EUROPEA 129–33 (2009)  
 41.  See Paolo Cappellini, Scienza Civilistica, Rivoluzioni Industriali, Analisi Economica del Diritto: 
Verso una Neopandettistica Involontaria?, 15 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO 
GIURIDICO MODERNO 523, 523–30 (1986).  
 42.  Pietro Costa, Cittadinanza Sociale e Diritto del Lavoro Nell’Italia Repubblicana, in DIRITTO E 
LAVORO NELL’ITALIA REPUBBLICANA 21–83 (Gian Guido Balandi & Giovanni Cazzetta eds., 2009). 
 43.  SOMMA, supra note 40, at 110–24. 
07_SOMMA_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2013  12:33 AM 
112 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:105 
individual capacities consistent with market competition rules. This is the point 
of reference for disclosing the public dimension of contract consistent with the 
current evolution of capitalism and for letting its biopolitical inspiration 
emerge.44 
To verify how this scheme helps to detect the deep inspiration of European 
contract law, one can refer to the rules concerning the prohibition of 
discrimination in order to underline continuities between the prohibition’s 
origin and its current development. 
The first time private law considered such a prohibition was during World 
War II, within the so-called Fair Employment Act, an executive order of U.S. 
President Roosevelt that “reaffirm[ed] policy of full participation in the defense 
program by all persons, regardless of race, creed, color or national origin.”45 
Indeed, from its very beginning, non-discrimination policies were intended to 
enhance the functioning of the market in such a way, for example, that it could 
fit into national defense strategies. Afterwards, other state strategies were 
enhanced by the prohibition of discrimination. Nevertheless, their compliance 
with systemic needs of the market order never ceased to represent its first 
inspiration, as the current evolution in EU contract law clearly shows. 
Emancipative effects are not excluded, but they mainly represent the indirect 
effects of functionalizing strategies directly aimed at favoring the market order. 
In line with this scheme, the Draft Common Frame of Reference provides 
for “a right not be discriminated against on the grounds of sex or ethnic or 
racial origin in relation to a contract” concerning “goods or services which are 
available to the public.”46 This is not a rule directly protecting human rights, as 
stated in the introduction to the Draft,47 at least not in the sense that human 
rights have directly to do with individual emancipation, not in the sense that 
they do not need to be filtered by the market systemic logic. Of course, the 
protection of human rights through a market economy is a possible outcome, a 
possible side effect of a rule concerning the inclusion in the market of persons 
called upon to fulfill systemic tasks or delegated economic police functions. A 
supplier of goods or services, denying the conclusion of a contract with certain 
categories of consumers, prevents them from acting as efficient selectors of his 
or her supply. He or she exercises an autonomous economic power, imposing 
his or her own strategy on how, or how not, to make use of the competitive 
mechanism. 
For the same reasons, discriminatory behavior of our supplier will be taken 
into account by consumer-protection rules, producing possible emancipatory 
side effects, even if directly conceived as rules aiming at preventing market 
 
 44.  VANNI CODELUPPI, BIOCAPITALISMO VERSO LO SFRUTTAMENTO INTEGRALE DEI CORPI, 
CERVELLI ED EMOZIONI (2008). 
 45.  Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941) (capitalizations removed). 
 46.  STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & ACQUIS GRP, supra note 36, at 14.  
 47. Id. 
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failures. This is the sense of social market economy and of the ordoliberal 
inspiration for non-discrimination in European contract law.48 
We derive evidence of such inspiration by considering the personal 
characteristics that are taken into account by the rule we have just mentioned—
that is, a person’s sex and racial or ethnic origin. A broader formulation is 
contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of “social origin” and “property.”49 Considering 
these characteristics would mean, for example, that a bank could not refuse a 
loan to a temporary worker. Such a measure would contribute to individual 
emancipation, but would also represent a possibly disruptive factor for the 
correct functioning of the market in a private law society. Emancipation 
through the market may be an illusion, and it is often an illusion. 
The idea of social market economy as eugenics and as a form of economic 
racism may be found in what early ordoliberals used to postulate about the 
supremacy of the political over the economic constitution: that the economic 
constitution, just like demography and racial biology, had to put into effect the 
political constitution.50 Such a statement helps us to understand how the 
prevalence of the order over the individual in systemic terms has to be seen as 
the main characteristic of ordoliberalism and the reason for its tendency to 
direct behaviors in biopolitical terms. 
V 
ORDOLIBERALISM AS BIOPOLITICS 
The current use of biopolitics in social science discourse mainly goes back to 
Michel Foucault.51 We find a first attempt to define this concept in his trilogy on 
the history of sexuality, in which he describes a progressive shift in the essence 
of political power, more and more inclined to “foster life or disallow it to the 
death” than to “take life or let live.” To that end, an “anatomo-politics of the 
human body” and “a bio-politics of the population” are needed—the first 
concentrating on “the body as a machine” and the second on “the species 
body.”52 
Investigating its origin, Foucault establishes a link between biopolitics, 
defined as the attempt “to rationalize the problems posed to governmental 
practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a 
population,” and the “political rationality” of liberalism. In this context the 
latter is considered anything but a theory on unlimited freedom, because 
 
 48.  Alessandro Somma, Principio di Non Discriminazione e Cittadinanza nel Diritto Privato 
Europeo, in IL DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO EUROPEO 259, 259–
80 (Guido Alpa et al. eds., 2009). 
 49.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21.   
 50.  BÖHM, supra note 26, at 13 (showing that ordoliberals and Nazi regime converged well apart 
from the idea on how market should be ordered). 
 51.  See also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE  (1998).  
 52.  MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE WILL TO KNOWLEDGE 135–39 ( 2d ed. 1990) (1976).  
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liberalism “needs freedom,” but also needs to “consume” it as a condition of 
historical and social possibilities for a free market economy. As for the specific 
ordoliberal way of matching together production and consumption of freedom, 
Foucault notes that early supporters of that doctrine intended to redefine 
capitalist rationality in a different way than the one sponsored by the Nazis.53 
Some parts of this reasoning may be questioned. For example, one may 
question the implicit idea that anatomo-politics of the human body and 
biopolitics of the population can be distinguished, because it is difficult to 
conceive the latter without the former. This is particularly true for biopolitics 
enhancing a market order based on free competition, which acts at an anatomic 
and biological level, but also with deeper conditionings influencing consumers 
as well as producers, the latter including capital and labor conceived as a 
cooperative community.54 
The consideration of ordoliberalism and Nazism as alternative ideologies 
concerning the market order is also problematic. Indeed, ordoliberals did not 
oppose Nazi direct intervention in the market order, since they thought of a 
combination of direct and indirect state interference according to the historic 
contingencies.55 Moreover, even if ordoliberalism is not necessarily linked to 
antidemocratic thinking and practices, it is at least indifferent towards the 
destiny of democracy. Politics has to impose a market order based on 
competition and this agenda may also include the instauration of authoritarian 
or totalitarian regimes. In doing this politics still makes use of violence, even if 
related to aesthetics which are different from the traditional one.56 
Above all, ordoliberalism intends to fight pluralism in order to reduce 
individual behavior to a mere automatic reaction to market stimuli.57 This 
implies a condemnation of pluralism as such, which is seen as a source of 
conflicts because it enhances individual emancipation. Thus, pluralism is an 
obstacle to functionalizing strategies of the proprietary organism, in a way that 
is incompatible with democratic decision-making: ordoliberalism intends to 
enhance vital forces simply in order to guide them towards systemic needs 
transcending the individual.58 
The struggle against pluralism derives from conceiving ordoliberalism as a 
completion of the program of the French Revolution. In fact, following 
 
 53.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 
1978–1979, at 63, 317–22 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2008). See also Richard Faber, 
Autoritärer Liberalismus: Von Thomas Hobbes zu Carl Schmitt, in LIBERALISMUS IN GESCHICHTE 
UND GEGENWART 59–77 (Richard Faer ed., 2000).  
 54.  See LAURA BAZZICALUPO, IL GOVERNO DELLE VITE:  BIOPOLITICA ED ECONOMICA (2006). 
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ordoliberal thinkers, the bourgeois society had a fundamental historical 
function, since it gave value to the principle of self-determination, thus freeing 
the individual from the constraints of feudal structures. Yet, the order of the 
bourgeois society started exactly as “order,” aimed at the steering of individual 
forces towards a “reasonable general use.” In the program of the French 
Revolution, “the aim of liberation and the aim of direction could not be 
separated.”59 
A link with the French Revolution ideology may also be seen in the 
ordoliberal fight against pluralism. To overcome the feudal structures, French 
revolutionaries had to remove each intermediary body between the individual 
and the state. Similarly, from the very beginning, ordoliberals pleaded for a 
“strong state” able to establish a “healthy economy,”60 that is, a state that has to 
impede the emergence of powers acting in a different way than that consistent 
with the needs of the economic system. 
The biopolitical inspiration of this program may be seen in the analysis of 
what is intended to produce an effective conformation of economic life. 
Ordoliberals did not condemn direct conformation by law, which was supposed 
to produce positive effects if needed by the circumstances. However, they tried 
to demonstrate the supremacy of indirect conformation, not only because of the 
aptitude of the procedural approach to guiding economic actors towards 
concrete and precise substantial results. Indirect regulation was supposed to act 
as a “state-psychology” that could transform an individual into a tool of 
“political direction of social day-life,” even if he or she is not conscious of the 
fulfillment of the state’s “higher aims.”61 In other words, a market order based 
on free competition may rely on rules recognized by market operators.  The 
market order may also rely on “procedures and behaviors that reproduce basic 
social relationships, guide active growth regimes and ensure the accounting of a 
myriad of decentralized decisions, without actors necessarily being aware of 
these system-wide adjustment principles.”62 This is the main point of reference 
for holding ordoliberalism as a typical biopolitics. 
In line with biopolitics is also the reference to the “social,” which can be 
found in the evolution of ordoliberalism, above all with reference to the 
meaning of “social market economy.” This expression intends to underline the 
fact that a free competition-based market is a source of social values per se, so 
that no conformation of economic behavior in line with a social rights system is 
needed. What is more important from our point of view is that “social” refers to 
the need to produce social cohesion in order to prevent conflicts related to the 
process of modernization, which has to be encouraged in biopolitical terms. 
 
 59.  BÖHM, supra note 26, at 3–7. 
 60.  Carl Schmitt, Starker Staat und Gesunder Wirtschaft, 2 VOLK UND REICH 81–94 (1933). 
 61.  Alexander Rüstow, Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik, 7 DER DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRT 169, 
172 (1932). See also BÖHM, supra note 26, at 113. 
 62. Robert Boyer, How and Why Capitalism Differs (Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper 05/4, 2005), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/ 
dp05-4.pdf. 
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This concern has led to the combination of market-order doctrines and 
Catholic social teaching,63 following early ordoliberalism with its traditional plea 
for class harmony and collaboration.64 Even if this enhances corporatism, 
allowing forms of pluralism that were opposed by early ordoliberalism, the 
same cannot be said for social market economy, thus confirming the biopolitical 
essence of the modes of regulations needed to stabilize the related 
accumulation regime. 
 
 
 63.  See DIETER HASELBACH, AUTORITÄRER LIBERALISMUS UND SOZIALE 
MARKTWIRTSCHAFT, GESELLSCHAFT UND POLITIK IM ORDOLIBERALISMUS 117–58 (1991). 
 64.  This may be seen as a main concern for the emergence of Catholic social teaching. See Rerum 
Novarum, Encyclical Letter from Pope Leo XIII, at ¶¶ 2, 3, 8 (May 15, 1891), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novaru 
m_sp.html.   
